Towards Reconciliation? Heritage Politics and identity in the Preah Vihear conflict
Mengyao Li
To commemorate the 15th anniversary of the inscription of the Preah Vihear temple on the World Heritage List, The National Authority for Preah Vihear hosted a grand celebration on 7 July this year. Since UNESCO declared the Preah Vihear temple a Cambodian World Heritage Site in 2008, relations between Thailand and Cambodia have rapidly deteriorated. Not only did the two sides start a three-year military standoff at the border, but several armed clashes erupted in the first six months of 2011, resulting in the deaths and injuries of soldiers and the displacement of tens of thousands of border residents. Relations between the two countries have been gradually mending over the past decade, with a focus on the global tourism market rather than past territorial disputes.
This article reveals how the symbolism of this ancient Khmer temple has been shaped by intricate power dynamics of the past. Different interpretations of the past and competing senses of territorial sovereignty have led to a long history of discord over heritage. The conflict on the border occurred just five years after the Preah Vihear temple finally became a symbol of friendship between the two countries. The focus is on how politics and identity in heritage interact with border disputes and armed conflicts. It is also equally important to understand why this conflict remained at a low intensity and did not deteriorate further, as well as the complexity of its consequences.
An Obscure Archaeological Site
From the 9th to the 12th centuries, most of Thailand was still within the Khmer Empire, or Cambodia as it is known today. During this period, many Khmer temples were erected and scattered across its extensive territory; among them was the Preah Vihear temple, perched on the cliffs of the Dangrek Mountains. Despite the rugged terrain, the Khmers and Kui living on either side of the range had close cultural and trade exchanges (Swift 2006, 296). After the expansion of the Siamese empire in the 15th century and the capture of Angkor in 1431, the Khmer empire became a vassal state of Siam. The Siamese monarchs of Ayutthaya legitimised their dominance through ‘Khmerised’ in the early period (Denes 2012, 175), which not only ensured the establishment of a narrative of continuity with the glorious past of the Khmer empire but also led to greater political and cultural integration between the two sides.
In the eighteenth century, people living around the Dangrek Mountains appeared in the royal chronicles of Siam as a tributary chiefdom, called the ‘domain of the forest Khmer’ (Denes 2012, 171). This traditional notion of political space, where power overlapped territorially, would be gradually subverted with the arrival of French colonists in the 1860s. After the discovery of Angkor Wat, France combined the acquisition of the remains of ancient civilisation with colonial territorial expansion and became a protectorate of Cambodia (Hauser-Schäublin 2011, 39-41; see also Silverman 2011, 3). In the decades to come, France began to work towards the expulsion of Siam from Cambodian territory.
In 1893, King Chulalongkorn (r 1868–1910) signed a series of ultimatums recognising French sovereignty over a large area of the northeastern Siam (Strate 2013, 43). A series of territorial conflicts spawned several administrative reforms in Siam. The ‘domain of the forest Khmer’ was incorporated into ‘Monthon Isaan’ (the Northeastern Circle) in 1899 (Paitoon 1984), a region where all people, regardless of ethnicity, shared a common ‘Isan’ (Northeasterners) identity. The Preah Vihear temple was ‘re-discovered’ by the Siamese Prince Sanphasit and other high commissioners during this time (Oliver 1962, 1042). Before this, the monarch of Bangkok was likely unaware of its existence. In the new treaty delimiting the border in 1907, the temple was quietly placed within the boundaries of French Indochina due to the description in the text deviating imperceptibly from the drawn map submitted by the French to the Siamese government in 1908 (Strate 2013, 48).
On the brink of war
During the Second World War, Field Marshal Phibunsongkham (1938-44, 1948-57) signed the Tokyo Peace Treaty with Indochina and regained legal control of the Preah Vihear temple. To ‘appropriate prerogatives that were customarily associated with the monarch’ (Peleggi 2002, 39), Phibun donated some baht for the restoration of the Preah Vihear temple, which was under Western control and in a state of decay and disrepair. The return of this magnificent temple confirmed that the era of high imperialism was a thing of the past and that Thailand had overcome the shame of its past (Strate 2013, 51). However, the brief bubble of happiness brought about by the return of lost territories unceremoniously burst with the Japanese surrender in 1945. France reacquired control of Preah Vihear under the Washington Treaty of 1946 (St John 1994, 64). As the Preah Vihear temple had become as important as Angkor Wat in Thai media propaganda, people who could not accept the loss of it wrote letters to newspapers calling for war with France (Strate 2013, 52). The Thai government eventually accepted the fate reluctantly, while the painful memories of the loss of the temple were hard to dissipate.
The decline of European empires after the Second World War allowed many former colonial countries to become independent, and Cambodia became one of them in 1953. However, political instability, economic shortages, and the bipolar environment of the Cold War reinforced the fragility and insecurity of the fledgling new nation. At this sensitive time, the Thai government, led by Phibun, flew the Thai flag over the temple ruins under the pretext of strengthening border defences. As a result, the Cambodian government and media disseminated this action as evidence of Thailand’s invasion of Cambodia. King Norodom Sihanouk ignored the French colonial past and pointed the finger at Thailand, claiming that Thai imperialism was the real threat to Cambodia (Strate 2013, 53-54). In an interview with the Japanese press, Cambodia’s then-Prime Minister Sim Var also described the Preah Vihear temple as a pretext for the Thai wolves to devour the Cambodian lambs once and for all (Chamrat 1962, 187).
Differing interpretations of the past have made it difficult for both sides to negotiate over the Preah Vihear temple. Their disputes escalated into an international issue with Cambodia’s initiation of legal proceedings against Thailand at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in October 1959. The protracted court battle triggered a wave of donations to the Thai government’s legal defence fund (Strate 2013, 60). The fundraising campaign that swept through Thailand’s provinces proved that the painful memories about the ‘loss’ of the Preah Vihear temple have never gone away. After the ICJ upheld Cambodian sovereignty in June 1962, not only did mass protests erupt in Thailand, but its government followed with a series of anti-Cambodian propaganda campaigns. Thai Khmers living on the northern side of the Dengerk range were not only required to destroy Khmer language materials but were no longer allowed to give Buddhist sermons in the Khmer language (Vail 2007, 121).
The ICJ judgement did not settle the Preah Vihear dispute. Thailand did not want to give up the Preah Vihear temple easily, and Cambodia also sent senior representatives to Beijing for consultations immediately after the verdict (Pradhan 1985, 74). Relations between the two countries were quite tense for a while. Ultimately, Thailand relinquished the temple due to pressure from the United States and its allies (Leifer 1974, 51; Singh 1962, 26). Although an impending war with Thailand was averted, Cambodia soon descended into a bloody and brutal civil war.
Time to reopen the border
With the end of the Cold War and the internationalisation of the economy, the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia also ushered in a turning point. To promote peace and stability through the development of economic ties, Thai Prime Minister Chatchai (1988-1991) quickly announced a new policy of ‘transforming Indochina from a battleground to a marketplace’ after taking office (Salinee 2021, 37). Parliamentarians from northeastern Thailand submitted a request to the cabinet to allow tourists to visit temples to promote tourism in March 1989. The two countries subsequently launched demining work around the Preah Vihear temple and formulated regulations for visiting (Puangthong 2013, 47). Visits to the temple returned to normal completely after the Cambodian army incorporated the Khmer Rouge forces roaming the area.
In the 1990s, the Thai government began restoring other Angkorian ruins in its northeast that symbolise the power and origins of the pre-colonial Siamese empire. This state-led movement to revitalise Khmer heritage brought the Thai Khmer people, mainly concentrated in the northern part of the Dangrek range, out of ‘essentially invisibility’ (Smalley 1994: 140). Regarding the Khmer identity, they felt an embarrassment that continues today (Denes 2012, 172). In addition to the fears created by the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge (1975-79), there is also a past in which Thailand has tended to portray the Khmer as traitors and enemies.
As Denes (2012, 179) has shown, the boundaries of the Thai nation-state constrained the Thai Khmers’ embrace of their heritage. An illustrative instance was the government’s reluctance to support the teaching of the Khmer language in schools. Moreover, she contended that the localist cultural renaissance of the 1990s led to a reinforcement of the Thai Khmer’s narrative of cultural dominance, which amplified their prejudice against the Kui people and the Cambodian Khmer. She further pointed out that this phenomenon reproduced previous boundaries and stereotypes resulting from nationalism and the Cold War.
From a symbol of friendship to causing armed conflict
As mentioned above, economic cooperation between the two countries has allowed tourists to revisit the Preah Vihear Temple. The hostility that used to arise from this temple is also gradually disappearing. By 2003, they formed a joint committee to develop plans for the development and restoration of the temple, and the Preah Vihear Temple became a symbol of friendship between the two countries in their joint efforts (Puangthong 2013, 47).
Unfortunately, after UNESCO declared the Preah Vihear temple a Cambodian World Heritage Site in 2008, the symbol of friendship was shattered. Taking this opportunity, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used the world heritage nomination issue to incite ultra-nationalist sentiment in Thailand. With their mobilising power, the PAD helped Abhisit Vejjajiva to replace Samak as Prime Minister in December 2008 (Wagener 2011, 44). For Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen chose to strengthen the military build-up around the temple a week before the election to show his determination to defend the cultural claims of the Khmer people, which undoubtedly helped him win more votes. The two Prime Ministers pressured each other and deployed large numbers of troops to the border area, which increased the chances of friction between soldiers, setting the stage for a later escalation of the conflict.
Initially, the two countries attributed several brief firefights before 2011 to misunderstandings between patrol soldiers on both sides. However, the radical PAD felt that Abhisit Vejjajiva had been too lenient with Hun Sen and demanded military intervention in the disputed border area (The Economist, 2011). The conflict broke out in February 2011, with both sides using heavy weapons such as rocket launchers and artillery, resulting in several deaths and the displacement of thousands of border residents. The conflict and the destruction of cultural heritage soon drew the attention of the international community, and the Indonesian presidency of ASEAN at the time was trying to mediate and resolve the dispute between the two countries (Crisis Group, 2011).
Hun Sen and Abhisit only used the Preah Vihear temple to express their political positions and thus gain domestic support. There was no substantial preparation for large-scale military action on either side. Considering the disparity in military and economic power between Cambodia and Thailand, Hun Sen actually did not want the war to escalate, and this is why he actively sought the intervention and help of the international society after the conflict first broke out. For Abhisit, apart from the pressure from PAD, there is also the weighing of the Royal Thai Armed Forces leadership’s thoughts on the border dispute. Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatara announced in early April that Indonesian observers would not be allowed to enter the disputed border area (Wagener 2011, 46), which led to several more firefights between the two sides in April and May 2011.
The conflict over the Preah Vihear temple became increasingly intractable, and Abhisit eventually left it to his successor, Yingluck Shinawatra, after losing an election in July. Since then, this new Prime Minister has embarked on an effort to repair diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
Thanks for the conflict?
In Kimly’s (2016, 223) survey of popular discourse on the Preah Vihear conflict, a public servant in the capital commented: ‘I want to thank Thailand for causing the conflict. Otherwise, my province would be left isolated like a frog in the well.’ This sarcastic comment illustrated the complex consequences of the Preah Vihear conflict.
The conflict and the ICJ judgement in 2013 deprived the inhabitants on the Thai side of heritage access, a sense of belonging, and access to economic resources. They were not allowed to visit the temple through the previous route since the ceasefire in 2011. For Cambodia, the government immediately started infrastructure construction in Preah Vihear Province after the temple was listed. As a means of resisting Thai aggression, the government also initiated a migration programme. They encouraged residents to settle in the border area of Preah Vihear by providing houses and land (see Kimly 2016, 223). Between 2008 and 2012, more than 40,000 new residents moved to Preah Vihear province. With the significant media coverage of the temple’s successful inscription as a World Heritage Site and the border conflicts, the number of tourists travelling to Preah Vihear not only did not decrease during the military confrontation but instead peaked in 2010, tripling compared to 2007 (see Kimly 2016, 226).
The quality of life of new and old residents of Preah Vihear Province has improved dramatically during and after the conflict. However, it is worth noting that while the ‘I have pride to be born as Khmer’ (Hauser-Schäublin 2011, 34-35) on the panel displayed next to the temple emphasises and justifies the legitimacy of the Khmer identity in terms of ownership of the heritage and the territory, the indigenous minority living in the same area, Kui, are experiencing marginalisation. In addition to being excluded from a single narrative of heritage, the rate of disappearance of the forests and animals on which they depend has accelerated with the influx of newcomers. They feel both struggled and confused about how to retain their traditional way of life while benefiting from the modernisation process (see Kimly 2016, 230-31).
Conclusion
Now that heritage tourism is gradually recovering from the pandemic of a few years ago, the two sides appear poised to collaborate again in the future. In May 2023, Thailand requested the reopening of their tourism access to the Preah Vihear temple (Bangkok Post 2023). Cambodia’s optimistic signals of ‘Preah Vihear puts conflict behind’ (Khmer Times 2023) also hinted at the possibility of a rapprochement between the two sides.
From being an obscure site to being selected and deliberately placed within the framework of nationalist narratives, the Temple of Preah Vihear eventually became a medium for connecting culture to politics and identity. Some politicians selectively ignored the history of cultural hybridity between the two countries and achieved their political goals by strengthening the concepts of sovereignty and territory. In this process, not only was the cohesion of the heritage gradually eroded, but also the acceptability of the conflict was heightened.
The enthusiasm for heritage nominations has led to disputes over the origins of civilisations and ownership of cultures in many societies in Asia. While the likelihood of armed conflict over the Preah Vihear temple has diminished, the cultural similarity between Thailand and Cambodia continues to be a source of frequent disputes regarding ownership of their other forms of heritage (see The Diplomat 2023). In this regard, moving away from narrow and monolithic narratives by emphasising the plurality of heritage is a way forward.
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